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This is a theoretical study of human-capital accumulation, where parental, as well as public 
investments are essential. Policy influence rich and poor p arents differently when they make 
educational decisions. Rich parents allocate resources efficiently between physical b equests 
and educational investments, while poor parents only afford investments in children’s human 
capital. Therefore, educational equality between rich and poor children is not necessarily 
promoted by further investments in public schooling. Moreover, I show that educational 
investments in low-skilled parents may have substantial spill-over effects on their children. 
Tax policy may also b e used to influence human-capital accumulation, and I show that tax 
policy may have unexpected effects on the educational gap between rich and poor children. 
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During the last decades a lot of research has been done, in order to get a grip on the accumula-
tion process of human capital. In many theoretical models the accumulation of human capital 
of the young generation is solely determined by parental choice. Becker, Murphy & Tamura 
(1990), Becker (1991), Caballé (1995), and Rangazas (1996) are only a few examples where 
private parental investment is modelled as the only way to acquire human capital. In many 
countries, this is, of course far from true. In most OECD countries we actually observe well 
developed public schooling systems, where everyone has access to free schooling. This is also 
reflected in some recent theoretical works, which include public, as well as private invest-
ments in children’s education, see e.g. Becker & Tomes (1986), Kaganovich & Zilcha (1999) 
and Glomm & Kaganovich (1999). These models assume that both private and public invest-
ments are important to children’s accumulation of human capital, an assumption that also 
finds support in the empirical literature.
1 Haveman & Wolfe (1995) review and compare some 
empirical evidence, and conclude that in the U.S. parental investments are almost twice the 
public investments. This is perhaps not surprising in a country, which largely is characterised 
by private solutions and a small public sector. However, also in Sweden with its large public 
sector Klevmarken & Stafford (1999) observe a similar pattern. For Swedish children less 
than seven years old, total private investments are almost twice the public investments. For 
older children parental investments are smaller, but still exceed those undertaken by the gov-
ernment. Hence, it is an important task to figure out what determines these parental invest-
ments, which we can call within-the-family education, and how they interact with public edu-
cation. Heckman (2000) argues that learning starts early in life before formal education be-
gins, and that policies directed to families therefore may increase children’s human capital 
more than would further schooling investments. Just like Heckman I think that parental efforts 
are enormously important, and I explicitly model them jointly with public investments to see 
what consequences this might have for over all human-capital accumulation.  
 
The present paper is a theoretical attempt to investigate the importance of within-the-family 
education, and how it responds to economic incentives. Once we have understood that, we 
have a better chance to promote human-capital accumulation by economic policy. In my 
                                                 
1Quite a few empirical studies have been done, trying to analyse the effects of public, and/or parental invest-
ments on children’s achievements, see e.g. Heckman (2000), Meghir & Palme (1999), Klevmarken & Stafford 





model parental and public investments interact, and the former is highly dependent on the 
economic situation of the family. I analyse how different categories of parents respond to dif-
ferent economic policy, which results in conclusions about what policies enhance, and what 
policies mitigate educational inequality between rich and poor. 
 
I believe my model has the capability of shedding new light on a number of policy issues. 
Sjögren (1998) shows that Swedes’ occupational, and thus educational, choice often follows 
that of their parents. It has also been noticed that children of well-educated parents get better 
results already at secondary school,
2 and that few children of blue-collar workers go to uni-
versity. The reasons for this educational gap may be many, e.g. the parents’ general attitudes 
towards schooling. The social and cultural environment at home also influence children’s pos-
sibilities at school, factors which may well be closely connected with the educational level of 
the parents. However, in this paper I show that also the pure economic incentives to engage in 
children’s education are stronger for richer and more well-educated parents. This makes it 
possible to reduce the educational gap in society by altering economic incentives, which af-
fect rich and poor parents in different ways. My results show that it is not at all certain that 
increased public education is the best way to help poor children catch up with the rich ones, 
which is a widespread assumption, see e.g. Thurow (1972). On the contrary, I show that in-
creased investments in public education may even widen the educational gap. Moreover, I 
show that due to spill-over effects on children, investments in the human capital of the least 
educated parents would unambiguously promote welfare and equality among children. It is a 
perhaps surprising result that increased adult education has a larger effect on equality than 
education of the young, but this is due to the fact that more educated parents are more prone 
to invest in their children’s human capital.  
 
In principle, within-the-family education can be either a substitute or a complement to public 
education, and it may consist of both time and goods.  It could e.g. be efforts to teach children 
manners, to help them do their homework, to buy a computer, or to send them on a language 
course abroad. Also health and other physical aspects are important to the human capital of an 
individual, so nutritious food and medicine could also be considered human-capital invest-
ments, although it is the educational aspect of human capital, which is stressed throughout this 
paper. Maybe it is most likely that public and private human-capital investments are comple-
                                                 





ments. The main reason for assuming this complementarity is that in many Western countries, 
elementary and secondary schooling are mandatory and publicly provided free of charge, and 
higher education is free, or, at least heavily subsidised. Then private investments are likely to 
take the more informal form of providing children with complementary skills, and of helping 
them do as well as possible at the public school, rather than to substitute public for private 
education. However, it could even be possible that private and public investments are com-
plements in some families and substitutes in others, as suggested by Kim (2001). In the analy-
sis I allow for the possibilities that private and public education may be either substitutes or 
complements. 
 
In the literature on human-capital accumulation authors have stressed various motives to in-
vest in children’s human capital. Cremer, Kessler & Pestieau (1992), Balestrino (1997), 
Lagerlöf (1997) assume an exchange motive, so a larger investment is “paid back” in terms of 
a larger contribution from the adult child to the retired parent.
3 If the child is altruistic towards 
the parent (Lagerlöf (1997)), or the parent can “bribe” the child to care for him in his later 
years (Cremer et al. (1992)), or if there are social norms forcing the child to support him (Bal-
estrino (1997)), even a completely selfish parent will find it worthwhile to invest in the child’s 
human capital, because this will be a substitute for savings. Many authors instead assume that 
parents are purely altruistic towards their children, and therefore undertake human-capital 
investments, see e.g. Becker (1991), Becker & Murphy (1988), Becker et al. (1990), Caballé 
(1995) and Rangazas (1996). Others assume that parents are not concerned with their chil-
dren’s utility, but rather with their “quality”, represented by e.g. their level of education. 
Becker & Tomes (1976), Kaganovich & Zilcha (1999), Glomm & Kaganovich (1999), and 
Kim (2001) are some papers assuming this more paternalistic kind of altruism. When there is 
two-sided altruism between parent and child, like in Rangazas (1991) and Chakrabarti, Lord, 
& Rangazas (1993), the parent has strategic, as well as altruistic reasons to invest in the 
child’s human capital.  
 
In this paper, I stick to the strand of research, which assumes that parents are purely altruistic 
towards their children. Parents want to give their children as good consumption opportunities 
as possible, without noticing that children might be altruistic in return. I assume that parents 
make transfers to their children through within-the-family education and possibly by leaving a 
                                                 





bequest of physical capital. In the model parents are characterised by their propensity to leave 
physical bequests in addition to investments in within-the-family education. If there are di-
minishing returns to within-the-family education and constant returns to physical-capital in-
vestment, rich parents will choose an efficient level of human-capital investment where mar-
ginal returns are equal between human and physical capital investments. Parents who do not 
have that much assets, or earnings possibilities will only invest in human capital, because the 
returns to within-the-family education exceed those of bequeathing physical capital. Parents 
who only invest in their children’s human capital will therefore invest an inefficiently small 
amount. This inefficiency stems from the fact that parents cannot force their children to share 
their future income with them. This implies that children of poor parents get a lower level of 
human capital than do children of rich parents, in spite of an equal level of public education 
for everyone. The paper shows that by improving the economic situation for poor parents by 
means of fiscal policy this inequality could be decreased. 
 
Another way to mitigate the underinvestment caused by the inability to force children to share 
the returns of education is to introduce a pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) pension system, where 
children are actually forced to pay their parents a certain amount. This has been proposed by 
several authors, see e.g. Drazen (1978) and Becker (1991), as a means of reducing ineffi-
ciency in the economy. Also in the model in the present paper efficiency could be promoted 
by the introduction of a PAYGO system, and with a sufficiently large lump-sum transfer from 
young to old, the educational gap between rich and poor totally vanishes. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model, and the character-
istics of utility maximisation. Section 3 analyses the optimal behaviour of poor parents, who 
can only afford to transfer resources to their children through within-the-family education, 
and of rich parents who also transfer physical capital. The analysis is made with means of 
comparative statics, that explores the different economic incentives for the two groups of par-
ents. In section 4 I analyse and discuss some policy implications, with emphasis on public 
education and taxation, to see what can be done to decrease inequality in society, both in 
terms of education and in terms of consumption possibilities. In section 5 I discuss the intro-
duction of a PAYGO system, and study under what conditions such a policy would be Pareto 





2 The  model 
Let us consider a family, consisting of a parent and a child, where the former is altruistic to-
wards the latter, insofar that he includes the child’s utility from consumption in his own utility 
function. Each generation is assumed to live for three periods, as young, as middle aged, and 
as retired. When the parent is middle aged, his child is young, and when he is retired, the child 
has turned middle aged.
 When young, agents make no economic decisions, so we can concen-
trate on the periods of adulthood. The utility of the parent is then represented by 
         ) (   ) ( ) ( 2 1 k k p c U c u c u U γ + + = ,                           (1) 
with subscripts p and k for parent and kid, respectively. Uk is the child’s utility of consump-
tion when adult, ck, and the parent’s total utility, Up is additively separable between consump-
tion in the two periods, c1 and c2, and the child’s utility. This additive separability implies that 
consumption is a normal good, with respect to own consumption in both periods, as well as to 
the child’s consumption. Both u and Uk are strictly concave, twice continuously differentiable, 
and fulfil the Inada conditions. For simplicity the time preference factor is set to unity. Fur-
thermore, for simplicity but without any loss of generality, I disregard any intertemporal deci-
sions made by the child. In effect, I regard the child as being an adult for one period only. The 
degree of altruism from parent to child is represented by  0 > γ , and the higher the value of γ, 
the more weight is given to the child. 
 
During their active period of adulthood, agents work, and get paid in proportion to their level 
of human capital. The parent’s human capital hp is given, while the child acquires human 
capital through the public schooling system, h0, and the parent’s own investments,  x ˆ , accord-
ing to the production function 
             () x h f hk ˆ , 0 = ,                      (2) 
which is strictly concave in x ˆ . Furthermore, the partial derivatives, fi, are positive () x h i ˆ   , 0 = , 
and the Inada conditions are fulfilled for both inputs. The private investments reflect the spe-
cific time share, x, actually devoted to educate the child.
4 I assume that the parent’s time in-
vestment is more productive, the higher is his level of human capital hp, and that it is the ef-
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fective time,  p xh x = ˆ  that matters in the production function.
5 The variable hp may moreover 
reflect the social and cultural environment the child has at home, which is also important for 
the child’s achievements at school. Skolverket (1999) even concludes in a report that the most 
important variable for achievements at school is the educational level of the parents. I assume 
that the level of h0 is equal for all children in the economy, so that a higher level of public 
schooling increases human capital for everyone ceteris paribus. It is not obvious whether h0 
and  x ˆ  should be regarded as substitutes or as complements in human-capital formation.
6 
Some of the results in the paper are sensitive to assumptions about substitutability or com-
plementarity, and the issue will be further discussed below.  
The budget constraints for the parent are 
           s x h w c p p − − = ) 1 ( 1                      (3) 
              b s c s − − = ) 1 ( 2 τ                       (4) 
In the first period (disregarding childhood) the parent has a human capital endowment, hp. He 
is also endowed with one unit of time, of which a fraction x is used to educate the child, and 
(1-x) is supplied in the labour market. He recieves an exogenous net-of-tax wage, wp,
7 per unit 
of supplied human capital hp(1-x). Income is used for consumption, 1 c , and saving, s. In the 
second period the parent uses his savings net of wealth taxation, (1-τs), for own consumption, 
2 c , and possibly a bequest, b, to the child. For convenience, the interest rate is set at zero.  
 
When it comes to the child, we abstract from savings, as well as from endogenous labour sup-
ply, and concentrate on consumption possibilities in the second, active period. The child’s 
consumption equals his income, which consists of labour income proportional to the achieved 
level of human capital, hk, and possibly a bequest from the parent. This bequest is taxable at 
the rate τb. Hence, it follows that 
                                                 
5 One might argue that hp should be included separately, reflecting the biological inheritance of abilities and 
intelligence, which is unintendedly transferred from parent to child, like in Becker (1991), Becker & Tomes 
(1976, 1979, 1986), or Giannini (1999). However, it appears likely that also inherited abilities are more devel-
oped, the more time the parent spends with the child to share his knowledge.  The model of this paper is more in 
line with Heckman (2000) who suggests that abilities are developed and can be influenced by policy. 
6 There is no consensus about this in the existing literature. Glomm & Ravikumar (1992) and Kaganovich & 
Zilcha (1999) assume that public and private investments are complements, whereas Becker & Tomes (1986) 
instead are inclined to the assumption that they are substitutes. Kim (2001) suggests that for highly educated 
parents they are complements, whereas they are substitutes for poor parents. 





             ) 1 ( b k k k b h w c τ − + = ,                     (5) 
where hk is defined in (2), and wk is the child’s net-of-tax wage rate. 
 
Inserting (3), (4), and (5) into (1) we obtain the parent’s maximisation problem 
                    
{} ( ) () ( ) ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( max
, , b k k k s p p p s b x b h w U b s u s x h w u U τ γ τ − + + − − + − − =             (6a) 
                     s.t.  0      , 1 0 ≥ ≤ ≤ b x .                                         (6b) 
In principle, s can be either positive or negative. However, a positive s is the only way for the 
parent to get positive period-two consumption, so the Inada conditions of the utility function 
assure that  0 > s . There are still the three inequality constraints in (6b) to consider, but we 
may in fact disregard the two regarding x. Because  ∞ → x f ˆ  as  0 → x  ( i.e. the Inada condi-
tion), the constraint  0 ≥ x , will never bind; thus there will always be some time invested in 
educating the child. Neither will  1 ≤ x  bind; because of the Inada condition of the utility func-
tion,  ∞ → ∂ ∂ c u/  as  0 → c . The non-negativity constraint on bequests,  0 ≥ b , comes from 
the legal restriction implying that the parent cannot leave legally binding debt to the child, and 
as there is no altruism from the child to the parent, the child will not voluntarily give any as-
sets to the parent. Hence, if the parent would actually want to receive something from the 
child, all he can do is to abstain from bequeathing.  
 
The first-order conditions with respect to x, b, and s which are necessary and sufficient for a 
utility maximum then become 
             , 0     ˆ 1 = ′ + − =
∂
∂
x k k p
p f w U u w
x
U
γ                                   (7) 
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where ui, i=1, 2 denotes the marginal utility of parental consumption in the i:th period, and 
(8b) is the complementary slackness condition.  
 
If  0 > b , the condition (8a) holds with equality. Since the marginal rate of return on within-
the-family education is decreasing, while the return to saving and bequeathing is constant, the 
parent will only invest in human capital to the point where these marginal returns are the 
same; see point 
* ˆ x in Fig. 1. Additional transfers to the child will be in terms of physical be-
quests. Combining (7)-(9) then gives the following arbitrage-like condition: 
         x k s b p f w w ˆ ) 1 )( 1 ( = − − τ τ ,                                                   (10) 
which says that at the optimum, the marginal return from investing one hour in the child’s 
human capital should equal the constant rate of return to working that hour, and then save and 
bequeath the received wage, see 
* ˆ x in Fig. 1.
8 Because the left-hand side of (10) is identical 
for every parent in the economy, so must the right-hand side be. If we assume the same pro-
duction function of human capital for everyone, it is clear from (10) and 
* ˆ x in Fig. 1 that all 
children who also receive physical bequests will have the same level of human capital.  
 
 
Fig. 1 Efficient and inefficient human-capital investments from the parent’s point of view. 
                                                 
8 From an individual point of view, 
* ˆ x  is the efficient time investment, but due to the tax wedges, 
* ˆ x  is not likely 





If the inequality in (8a) is strict, we have a corner solution with zero bequests, i.e.  0 = b , and 
the parent only invests in the child’s human capital. This situation occurs when the parent’s 
marginal utility of consumption as retired exceeds the child’s marginal utility of the extra 
consumption enabled by the bequest, weighted by the degree of altruism, i.e. when 
k b U u ′ − > ) 1 ( 2 τ γ . Together, (7), (8a), and (9) give the following intuitive condition for the 
zero-bequest solution: 
       x k s b p f w w ˆ ) 1 )( 1 ( < − − τ τ ,                  (11) 
which says that the marginal return from human-capital investment exceeds the constant rate 
of return from bequeathing, at the point where  0 = b . In terms of Fig. 1 we may think of the 
zero-bequest solution as occurring at a point such as x′ ˆ . For a given individual, with a spe-
cific value of hp, the share  x′ is less than 
* x , which would be the efficient amount of time 
invested. Hence the bequest constrained parent invests too little in within-the-family educa-
tion, a result we recognise from Becker & Tomes (1986) who also find that only those who 
bequeath physical assets make efficient human-capital investments. The reason for the under-
investment is that negative bequests are ruled out. Parents would invest more if they could 
share the return from education with the child, but because they cannot force their children to 
pay them back, and since we assume that children are not altruistic toward their parents (at 
least, parents do not count on it), bequest constrained parents will instead invest too little.
9 
The model thus leaves us with two possible solutions, one interior with physical bequests 
) 0 ( > b  as well as within-the family education, and a corner one, where the bequest constraint 
is binding ) 0 ( = b . 
 
3 Comparative  statics 
3.1  Rich or poor? 
What factors determine whether parents end up in the corner or in the interior solution? From 
equation (11), it follows that people end up in the corner solution when the return to within-
the-family education is very high, or when taxes on saving and bequeathing are high. Hence, 
one could imagine a situation where no parent in the economy finds it worthwhile to leave a 
                                                 
9 Rangazas (1991) and Chakrabarti et al. (1993) show that when there is two-sided altruism and the parent is 
aware that larger human-capital investments imply larger voluntary contributions from the child, the parent will, 
in fact, make efficient investments. In the present paper it is thus the child’s lack of altruism that generates inef-





bequest, but that they all end up in the corner solution. However, since we actually observe a 
non-negligible part of the population leaving positive bequests, it seems more plausible to 
assume that only some subgroup of the population is constrained, in the sense that they do not 
have enough resources to leave a physical bequest. With the same wage and tax rates and the 
same access to public schooling, it is straightforward to show that the parents in the interior 
solution are the ones with a large human-capital endowment, or the rich ones, while those in 
the corner solution are the poor parents, who have less human capital and therefore earn less 
money in the labour market.
10 A proof of this result is shown in Appendix A. 
 
3.2  The behaviour of the poor 
Let us start by analysing the effects of different public policies on poor parents; i.e. parents 
with such a low level of human capital that they cannot afford to leave a physical be-
quest ) 0 ( = b . Table 1 shows the qualitative effects that different exogenous variables have on 
time in within-the-family education, x, on the child’s total human capital, hk, and on the 
child’s consumption,  k k k h w c = . All the tedious derivations are found in Appendix B, to-
gether with some additional discussion. Note also that all changes are marginal in the sense 
that the parent is assumed to remain in the corner solution.  
 
Table 1. Comparative statics for the corner solution 
  dx dhk  dck 
0 dh   ? ?  Sign[dhk]
p dh   ? + + 
p dw
  ? Sign[dx] Sign[dx] 
k dw   ? Sign[dx] + 
s dτ   ? Sign[dx] Sign[dx] 
 
 
Let me briefly discuss some of these results, proceeding down the rows of Table 1, trying to 
clarify the many question-marks. For the full analysis, see Appendix B.  
 
                                                 





A means that naturally comes to mind when we think of raising the level of human capital is, 
first of all, publicly provided education, h0. But, if we also consider within-the-family educa-
tion, the child’s over-all level of human capital, hk, does not necessarily increase, just because 
more resources go to public schooling. The parent namely alters x as a consequence of an in-
crease in h0. 
         () ()
C
x h x h k k s k k p
A







0 0 ) 1 ( − − + ′ ′
=
∂
∂ σ τ γ
,                (12) 
where  k k k k k h w U U ′ ′ ′ − = σ  is the child’s intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and  0 > C A  
is the system determinant of the corner-solution equation system, presented in Appendix B. 
 





is ambiguous without further assumptions about 
the human-capital production function. Especially the sign of the cross-derivative  x h f ˆ 0  is cru-
cial; if the two inputs are substitutes, i.e.  0 ˆ 0 ≤ x h f , the parent unambiguously decreases his 
educational investments, when public investments increase.
11 This is because income and sub-
stitution effects go in the same directions in this case. According to the income effect, x tends 
to decrease because the child becomes relatively richer with increased h0, and the parent then 
wants to increase his own material well-being as well. The substitution effect says that the 
marginal productivity of x decreases when h0 increases, which also tends to decrease x. If, on 
the other hand, h0 and  x ˆ  amplify each other, so that  0 ˆ 0 > x h f , we cannot tell whether the par-
ent increases or decreases time spent educating the child, because income and substitution 
effects now work in opposite directions. The income effect is the same as above, but now the 
parent tends to increase within-the-family education due to the substitution effect, because 
marginal productivity increases with h0.  
 
However, it is the total effect on the child’s human capital that is relevant, including the direct 
effect that public education actually has. The total effect on hk is achieved by differentiating 
(2) with respect to h0: 
                                                                                                                                                          
ability of being in the interior solution. 
11 Kim (2001) finds that mothers with low education significantly decrease their time investment when h0 in-
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which implies 
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.           (14) 
If   0 ˆ 0 ≥ x h f  the total effect is positive, that is, even if the parent might decrease his own in-
vestment, he will not decrease it in a one-to-one proportion, but the child’s level of human 
capital will unambiguously increase from increased public education. If, on the other hand 
0 ˆ 0 < x h f , it is not possible (without further assumptions) to tell whether the child’s total hu-
man capital increases or decreases. The parent unambiguously decreases x, and the total effect 
depends on which effect is the strongest, and the most important to total human-capital accu-
mulation, public, or within-the-family education. We can thus draw the somewhat awkward 
conclusion, that increased public investments in schooling may actually imply a lower level of 
human capital and consumption for children with bequest constrained parents. 
 
When parental human capital, hp increases, the parent’s productivity both in the labour market 
and in within-the-family education increases. Because of this we cannot tell whether the effect 
on x is positive or negative. The total effect on human capital is, however, positive, irrespec-
tive of the effect on time investment, because time itself in within-the-family education be-
comes more productive: 


































.                (15) 
If the parent gets an increased net-wage rate, wp, the income and substitution effects go in 
opposite directions. On the one hand, the parent gets more resources, and tends to increase 
total within-the-family education, so as to transfer some resources to the child (the income 
effect). On the other hand, it becomes more profitable to work in the market, which tends to 
decrease x (the substitution effect). If the income effect dominates, x increases with an in-





tion less than unity, which according to many empirical studies appears to be the most realis-
tic case, an increased parental wage rate makes the parent increase his educational invest-
ments, so that the child receives a higher human-capital level as well as higher consumption. 
 
An increase in the child’s net-wage rate  k w  makes the child richer, so due to the income ef-
fect, the parent wants to reduce within-the-family education. However, the return to education 
also becomes higher, which instead tends to increase x. It is now the elasticity of substitution 
of the child’s utility function that determines the direction of the total effect. When this elas-
ticity exceeds unity, the substitution effect dominates, and the parent increases within-the-
family education. If the elasticity of substitution instead is less than unity, a higher return to 
educational investments actually leads to a decreased human-capital level. However, because 
wk itself increases, so does the child’s consumption, irrespective of the effect on within-the-
family education. 
 
If the wealth tax τs increases, within-the-family education tends to decrease due to the income 
effect. The substitution effect goes in the opposite direction, because the parent would like to 
increase contributions to the child, as well as period-one consumption, in order to avoid the 
increased taxation in the second period. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution of the par-
ent’s utility function determines which effect dominates. When it is less than unity, x de-
creases with τs. With a higher propensity to substitute intertemporally, the substitution effect 
dominates, and within-the-family education instead increases with a higher wealth tax.  
 
3.3  The behaviour of the rich 
For a rich parent who leaves a physical bequest to the child in addition to human-capital in-
vestments, the results from the comparative statics are much more clear-cut than those for the 
poor parent. The reason is that there is now only a substitution effect connected with within-
the-family education; the income effect only operates via the bequest, b. This is because the 
return to working, saving and bequeathing,  ) 1 )( 1 ( s b p w τ τ − − , is fixed, while the marginal 
return to within-the-family education is a decreasing function of x. Table 2 shows the qualita-
tive effects that different exogenous variables have on x, b, hk, and on the child’s consumption 
in the interior solution,  ) 1 ( b k k k b h w c τ − + = . Appendix C presents the detailed derivation of 





Table 2. Comparative statics for the interior solution 
  dx Db dhk  dck 
dh0  ? ? ? + 
dhp  - + 0 + 
dwp  - + - + 
dwk  + - + + 
dτs  + - + - 




Let me again outline the intuition underlying some of the results. If the level of publicly pro-
vided education, h0 increases, also the relative return to x is affected, which alters within-the-
family education and the bequest: 
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,                (17) 
where  0 > Ω  is defined in Appendix C. 
 
If  0 ˆ 0 > x h f , increased public education increases the marginal productivity of x ˆ , which in-
duces the parent to spend more time educating the child. Instead the parent decreases b, both 
because of the income and of the substitution effect.
12 If  0 ˆ 0 < x h f  the parent will instead de-
crease x, and we cannot tell whether the bequest increases or decreases, because income and 
substitution effects go in opposite directions. Like in the case of the poor parent, if  0 ˆ 0 < x h f  
we may actually end up in a situation where the child’s total level of human capital decreases 
when public education increases. However, the rich parent would compensate such a loss by 
                                                 
12 We assume that the increase in h0 is marginal, in the sense that the parent will keep on leaving a positive be-
quest, but if the increase in h0 goes on, bequests will decrease, and eventually cease, and the parent will end up in 





an increased bequest, so that the rich child is always left with a higher consumption after in-
creased h0, irrespective of the sign of  x h f ˆ 0 . Thus we have that 































b h p x k
k τ .                (18) 
If parental human capital, hp, increases, the parent’s productivity will rise, in paid work, as 
well as in the efforts to educate the child. Because it is the effective time that counts, the par-
ent will reduce time spent on within-the-family education, and instead work more, just 
enough to leave the effective time unchanged: 




























.                (19) 
This solution, however, hinges on the assumption that it is effective time,  p xh x = ˆ , rather than 
x and hp separately that enters the human-capital production function.
13 With a higher hp the 
parent works more, and gets richer, while the child receives the same level of human capital 
as before. Due to the positive income effect, the parent then increases the bequest, leaving the 
child better off than before. 
 
If the parent’s net wage, wp increases, for instance because of a tax cut, it is more profitable to 
work an extra hour in the labour market, and hence reduce x. Instead, the parent increases b, 
both because he substitutes away from within-the-family education, and because he has be-
come richer, and wants to transfer some of the extra resources to the child. If the child’s net 
wage  k w  increases, the result is reversed. The bequest is reduced, since the child becomes 
richer. However, the return to education increases, so a larger proportion of the transfer is 
made through x. The child is left with a larger consumption after either type of wage increase. 
 
An increased wealth tax, τs, makes it less profitable to save, and thereby to bequeath; hence 
the parent substitutes away from b, towards x. An increased bequest tax, τb has the same effect 
on within-the-family education; it becomes relatively more profitable to educate the child than 
                                                 
13 If x and hp would be separate variables of the human-capital production function, there would be no clear ef-
fects on x from an increase in hp. The wage rate and the within-the-family production function would then de-
termine if the parent would choose to spend more time at work, or more time educating the child.  





to leave a bequest. When it comes to the bequest the parent wants to reduce b due to the sub-
stitution effect, but on the other hand he wants to compensate the child for the decreased in-
come, created by heavier taxation. Hence, we cannot tell whether b increases or decreases 
with  b τ . However, due to the direct effect of  b τ , ck unambiguously decreases after an increase 
in the bequest tax. 
 
4  Policy for equality? 
Tables 1 and 2 show that rich (i.e. those at interior solutions) and poor (i.e. those at corner 
solutions) parents respond in different ways to various policies, and that the difference 
primarily depends on the rich parent’s ability to shift between intergenerational transfers in 
the form of physical and human capital investments. This means that there is only a 
substitution effect connected with within-the-family education for rich parents, and that all 
income effects will operate entirely via changes in bequests. For poor parents who do not 
leave physical bequests there are income as well as substitution effects on within-the-family 
education. Hence, rich and poor parents respond in different ways. 
 
A major aim for governments is increased equality between rich and poor. This may be done 
in several different ways, but one important aspect is the distribution of human capital. Gov-
ernments are concerned with getting less well-situated people to acquire more human capital. 
Then it is of utmost importance to explore what kinds of policies that increase the level of 
human capital of the poor ones relative to the rich ones, and what policies that diminish the 
differences in consumption between the two groups.     
 
4.1 Public  education 
Investments in public education have always been regarded as a powerful tool to give the poor 
the opportunity to catch up with the rich. However, in a society with already well-developed 
public schooling, it is not necessarily the case that further investments in public schooling 
really promote equality between rich and poor pupils.  If we also consider within-the-family 
education, increased public education may actually increase inequality between rich and poor. 
For the educational gap to decrease the following derivative has to be positive: 
 




























































































                          (20) 
 




p h h < , and from equations (10) and (11) 




x f f ˆ ˆ > , but we cannot tell the sign of the complete expression with-
out further assumptions about functional forms. There are three different effects to consider. 
[1] The poor parent has a negative income effect connected with within-the-family education, 
which tends to decrease his investments, because the child gets richer c.p. when h0 increases. 
For the rich parent, on the other hand, there is no such income effect to be considered. [2] For 
both categories the direct effect 
0 h f  is positive, but we cannot tell who benefits the most from 
it. A simplifying, but not self-evident assumption is that the sign of the cross derivative  x h f ˆ 0  is 
the same for both parents.
14  Then  0 ˆ 0 > x h f  implies that the direct effect is stronger for the 
rich, and thus the direct effect tends to widen the educational gap further. If  0 ˆ 0 < x h f , the di-
rect effect instead decreases the gap, because it is stronger for the poor child who gets less 
within-the-family education. [3] The last effect is the substitution effect, which has the same 
sign as the cross derivative, for both rich and poor. However, we cannot tell who has the 
strongest effect, neither can we determine the sign of the total effect in equation (20). There-
fore we cannot say anything about equality in terms of consumption either. It may even be the 
case that equality increases in one respect, and decreases in another. Hence, we conclude that 
 
PROPOSITION 1: Increased public education may either increase or 
decrease inequality in society. 
 
Special case – logarithmic utility 
Logarithmic utility is commonly used in the literature on human capital.
15 Although some-
what restrictive, it is a functional form which is analytically tractable, and which generates 
closed-form solutions. If we apply it to the present model, and furthermore assume that the 
                                                 
14 Kim (2001) suggests that school expenditures and parental time are complementary only for rich parents, and 
not for the poor ones. In the context of this paper, that would imply increased inequality with certainty when h0 
is increased.  





production function of human capital is of Cobb-Douglas type, we get a model that gives un-
ambiguous results. The analysis is performed in Appendix D, where I show that  
 
PROPOSITION 2: With logarithmic utility and Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion function in the human-capital sector, increased public education 
increases the educational gap between rich and poor, but decreases 
inequality in terms of consumption. 
 
PROOF: See Appendix D. 
 
4.2  Education for poor parents 
In days of unemployment, labour market training programmes and other types of adult educa-
tion are often primarily used as kind of labour market policy. There has been intense debate 
on whether such education really is well invested money. On the basis of U.S. data, Heckman 
(2000) concludes that public education investments are more profitable for society the earlier 
in life they are undertaken, and Björklund & Kjellström (2000) conclude that the same holds 
true in Sweden. Forslund & Krueger (1997) analyse the Swedish labour market programmes, 
which they do not find to have been very effective in reducing unemployment or in enhancing 
workers skills. Therefore it may be argued that such programmes are not worthwhile, and that 
educational resources should be allocated to children, rather than to adults. However, none of 
the above-mentioned studies explicitly takes into account the spill-over effects on the next 
generation in terms of within-the-family education. Maybe one should wait some 20 years 
with the evaluation of labour market training programmes, so one can analyse their total ef-
fects, including those on children’s human capital. For instance, Behrman et al. (1999) show 
with data from rural India, that the spill-over effects are large enough to justify education of 
mothers, although they may not work in the market at all, but only help their children to ac-
cumulate human capital. The authors remark that one should be cautious, and not generalise 
the importance of maternal schooling to other countries, but at least their paper points out the 
fact that parental human capital is not unimportant for the productivity in within-the-family 
education. It could, hence, be useful to increase parental human capital, hp if the major aim is 
to increase levels of human capital and consumption for poor children. In fact, 
 





PROPOSITION 3: Policies that increase human capital of poor parents 
will promote equality between rich and poor children, both with re-
spect to human capital and consumption. 
 
PROOF: When the poor parent’s human capital increases, also his child gets a higher human- 
capital level, because the parent’s time becomes more productive, see equation (15). This re-
sults in a higher income for the child, and thus higher consumption. Because only poor par-
ents get increased human capital, rich families are unaffected. Hence, equality increases. ￿  
 
4.3  Parental wage rate    
If the government wants to increase equality by e.g. increasing h0 or hp it might choose to fi-
nance the reform by increasing the parental wage tax, which is equivalent to decreasing the 
net wage rate per unit of human capital, wp. This would, however, not be a very wise thing to 
do, because decreasing wp is most likely to increase the educational gap between the rich and 
the poor. For the rich, a lower wp unambiguously increases educational investments (see Table 
2), whereas for the poor, income and substitution effects go in opposite directions. In fact, 
 
PROPOSITION 4: If parents have an intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution less than or equal to unity, a decreased wage rate for both rich 
and poor parents increases the educational gap between rich and 
poor children. 
 
PROOF: According to equation (B9) in Appendix B, the poor parent decreases within-the-
family education when wp decreases, and his intertemporal elasticity of substitution is less 
than unity. Consequently, the poor child receives a lower level of human capital. If the elastic-
ity of substitution equals unity (logarithmic utility) within-the-family education is unaffected 
by the change in wp The rich child, on the other hand gets a higher level of human capital if wp 
is lowered, according to (C7) in Appendix C, irrespective of the magnitude of the intertempo-
ral elasticity of substitution. Hence, educational inequality increases. ￿  
 





4.4  Returns to education 
Increased returns to education have been pointed out as a way to get children of less educated 
parents to acquire more human capital. A higher return to education could make up for a po-
tential social obstacle to attend higher education (Sjögren (1998)). In that sense it is presumed 
that increased wk would promote equality. However, when parents, rather then children them-
selves, make investments in within-the-family education, it could well be the case that rich 
parents take advantage of the increased returns and increase their investments, while poor 
parents see an opportunity to increase their own well-being, and instead decrease educational 
investments when wk increases, contrary to the government’s intentions.  
 
PROPOSITION 5: If children has an intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution less than or equal to unity the educational gap is enhanced if 
returns to education increase. 
  
PROOF: The rich parent always increases within-the-family education when wk is increased, 
see equation (C10) in Appendix C. If the poor child has an elasticity of substitution, σk, less 
than one, the poor parent will actually decrease his educational investments, due to the fact 
that the wage increase makes the child richer, see equation (B10) in Appendix B. If σk =1, the 
poor parent will not alter x at all, and because the rich child unambiguously gets more educa-
tion, the educational gap increases in either case. ￿  
 
4.5 Wealth  tax 
Increased taxation on wealth and capital income is sometimes advocated as a tool to increase 
equality in society, because the rich are affected the most. However, if we take human-capital 
formation into account, the picture might change. On the one hand, rich parents tend to give 
up some physical investments, and instead increase human-capital investments. On the other 
hand, this is not likely to be true for a poor, bequest constrained parent, who instead might 
decrease within-the-family education in consequence of the increased tax, due to counteract-
ing income- and substitution effects. It may thus be shown that: 
 
PROPOSITION 6: If parents have an intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution less than or equal to unity, increased capital taxation implies 





PROOF: According to equation (B13) in Appendix B, the poor parent decreases x, after an 
increased τs if and only if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,  1 < p σ . If  1 = p σ the 
poor parent will not alter his behaviour after the increased tax. For the rich parent, (C13) in 
Appendix C implies that within-the-family education instead increases, irrespective of  p σ . 
Hence, educational inequality increases. ￿  
 
4.6 Bequest  tax 
Rich parents increase within-the-family education when  b τ  is increased, in the same way as 
after an increased wealth tax. However, the bequest tax does not affect the poor, at all. Hence, 
educational inequality unambiguously increases. 
 
5  A PAYGO Pension System – a Pareto Improvement? 
The human-capital investment undertaken by a rich parents who also leaves a physical be-
quest is efficient from the parent’s point of view, in the sense that he invests in within-the-
family education up to the point where the personal marginal return to investments in physical 
and human capital are equal (equation (10), and point 
* ˆ x in Fig. 1). However, the constraint 
that bequests must be non-negative binds for the poor parent, who therefore will only invest in 
human capital to a point where the marginal return to within-the-family education exceeds the 
constant return of saving and bequeathing (equation (11) and point x′ ˆ  in  Fig.1). If the gov-
ernment has the ambition to generate a more efficient and equal distribution of human capital, 
it should undertake policies that neutralise the constraint for poor parents, and/or that push 
more parents into the interior solution. If this can be done without generating further ineffi-
ciencies for those already in the interior solution, the policy is actually Pareto improving.  
 
One way could be to introduce a pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) pension system, where the adult 
child has to pay a lump-sum transfer, P, to his parent. Barro (1974) shows that when genera-
tions are altruistically linked, such a transfer would have no effect; parents just increase their 
voluntary transfer to the child. However, Drazen (1978) shows that this Ricardian Equiva-
lence does not necessarily hold when intergenerational transfers may take the form of both 
physical and human capital. In fact, lump-sum transfers have real effects when physical and 
human capital investments are not perfect substitutes, and the parent only makes the latter 





where parents are bequest constrained and only transfer human capital to their children. 
 
In the present model such a lump-sum transfer could be regarded as an induced loan from 
parent to child. The parent invests resources in the young child who, when adult has to pay a 
transfer to his retired parent. In this case the parent maximises 
            
{} ( ) () ( ) P b h w U P b s u s x h w u U b k k k s p p p s b x − − + + + − − + − − = ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( max
, , τ γ τ .      (21) 
Note that with the (exogenous) transfer, P, own savings are not the parent’s only period-two 
income anymore, so s may well be negative.                     
 
Within-the-family education undertaken by rich parents is not affected by the lump-sum trans-
fer, P, because there is no substitution effect connected with it.
16 However, the bequest will 
increase, because the parent becomes richer and the child becomes poorer. If Ricardian 
equivalence holds, there will be a one-to-one relation between increased pensions and in-
creased bequests, and the family is unaffected by the lump-sum transfer (see Barro (1974)). 
However, with a positive bequest tax, b τ , Ricardian equivalence fails to hold, and both the 
parent and the child end up with less consumption than before the introduction of the PAYGO 
system. For the rich families a lump-sum PAYGO system would thus imply no improvements 
(in presence of a bequest tax they would actually be worse off). Those who actually are ex-
pected to benefit from such a system are, however, those in the corner solution.  
 
Because the lump-sum transfer, P implies that the poor parent gets resources from the child, 
he is willing to increase his educational investment. If the enforced redistribution from child 
to parent is large enough within-the-family education will even increase sufficiently to gener-
ate a switch from the corner to the interior solution, where  x k s b p f w w ˆ ) 1 )( 1 ( = − − τ τ . Then we 
get rid of the inefficiency problem, and we also get a completely equal distribution of human 
capital. The inequality in terms of consumption would, however, remain, although to a de-
creased extent. In absence of a bequest tax, such a policy would be Pareto improving, because 
the rich family would be unaffected by the policy, while the former corner-solution family 
gets a better situation, where both parent and child get higher levels of consumption. Hence, 
 
                                                 





PROPOSITION 7:  A  PAYGO system with a large enough lump-sum 
transfer from child to parent, would eliminate the educational ineffi-
ciency of the poor, and all children would get an optimal level of hu-
man capital. 
 
Another way to increase equality by pushing the corner-solution parents into the interior solu-
tion could be to increase their human capital, hp. That would, however, imply an extra cost for 
the government, and financing that might cause undesirable distortions.     
 
6 Conclusion 
This paper has dealt with equality issues concerning the distribution of human capital, and 
especially the importance of educational investments made by parents. I call these parental 
investments within-the-family education; albeit informal, they respond to parents’ economic 
situation, and may be altered by political means. A rich parent allocates resources in a, for 
him efficient way between within-the-family education and bequeathing, which makes him 
react to fiscal policy in other ways than the less wealthy parent who only invests in within-
the-family education. This is the basic mechanism, which opens up for my unconventional 
policy results. 
 
One often thinks of increasing publicly provided education as a means to increase over-all 
education, and particularly education of those who do not have rich or well-educated parents. 
This paper has shown that increased public education of the young ones, may actually widen 
the income and educational gap between rich and poor children. This is because rich parents 
can afford to take advantage of the increased productivity generated by public investments, 
while the poor may instead substitute away from own educational investments when public 
investments increase, to be able to increase their own consumption.  
 
From an equality perspective, increasing human capital of less educated parents, would un-
ambiguously increase equality; poor parents get higher earnings capacity, as do their children 
who benefit from increased within-the-family education. This contradicts the common view 
that educational investments are more profitable the earlier in life they are undertaken; see 





due to the spill-over effects on the next generation. Increasing the wage tax (or decreasing the 
parental wage rate) could be a way to finance public investments. However, it is likely that 
such reform would increase inequality between children, which is also the likely outcome of 
increased wealth taxation.  
 
A lump-sum PAYGO system could mitigate the market failure by forcing children to pay a 
certain amount to their parents. This would encourage poor parents to increase their human-
capital investments. If the lump-sum transfer from child to parent is large enough, the poor 
child will even get the same level of human capital as the rich child, and also inequality with 
respect to consumption would be reduced. In the absence of a bequest tax, the rich family 
would be unaffected by the PAYGO system, and such reform would be Pareto improving, and 
the inefficiency would completely vanish. 
 
Needless to say, the model has its drawbacks. It is very simple to the structure, and the com-
parative statics analysis has totally omitted the general equilibrium aspect. This was done de-
liberately, in order to distinguish the effects from different policy. However, combined effects 
from different fiscal policy, including public education, would be a desirable task for future 
research, as would the inclusion of an infinite number of consecutive generations, which 
would enable us to analyse also long-run effects from different policy. Furthermore, assuming 
that parents are the ones who make all educational decisions, makes results somewhat differ-
ent, than if some decisions where instead made by children. It would be interesting to find out 
how the child’s decision would affect parental decisions and overall human capital. Another 
important question is what the human-capital production function really looks like. The as-
sumption in this paper that everyone receives the same amount of public education is rather 
strong. Even though public education in many countries is provided for free to everyone, we 
know that not everyone makes use of it to the same extent (this is especially true when it 
comes to higher education), and the access to public education may also vary between com-
munities. For instance, Benabou (1996) shows that when public schooling investments are 
made on a local basis, this in itself may cause inequality, because local governments in areas 
mostly inhabited by highly educated people tend to invest more in schools than those in areas 
where inhabitants have lower education. It is also important to analyse the way in which pri-
vate and public investments really interact in the human-capital production process, as it 





Hence, there is much research left to be done on this issue, and if we want to increase the edu-
cational level in society and remedy the socially unrepresentative intake to universities, it will 
be necessary to look beyond formal education, and also focus on within-the-family education 
in one form or the other.     
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Appendix A – Rich or poor? 
The condition for not leaving a bequest is:  
0 ) 1 )( 1 ( ˆ > − − − = ∆ s b p x k w f w τ τ ,                (A1) 
which is merely a rearrangement of (11). Wage and tax rates are the same for all parents in the 
economy, so the only variable which differs across parents is their level of human capital, hp. 
 
If a bequest constrained parent gets a larger human capital, then he will unambiguously ap-
proach the interior solution as the value of ∆ decreases: 
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.               (A2) 
Hence, the corner-solution parent is a parent who has less human capital than the interior so-





Appendix B – The corner solution (the poor) 
The equation system representing the solution for a poor parent, i.e. the corner solution with 
zero bequests is presented in (B1) on the next page. 
 
The determinant of the matrix on the left-hand side is: 







2 2 > − − + ′ ′ − − = x x x k k s k p k s p p C f f h u u U h w u u h w A σ τ γ τ ,        (B2) 
where  k k k k k U h w U ′ ′ ′ − = σ  is the elasticity of substitution of the child’s utility function. 
 
By using Cramer’s rule, all partial derivatives connected with the equation system above are 
determined. All changes are assumed to be marginal, in the sense that the parent will not 























































































































































































































































































































































































Public education h0 
If the government increases its educational investments, h0, the parent will respond to it in the 
following way: 
            () ()
C
x h x h k k s k k p
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∂
∂ σ τ γ
.                (12) 
If public and within-the-family education are substitutes, i.e.  0 ˆ 0 ≤ x h f , the parent decreases his 
educational investments, when public investments increase. This is because income and sub-
stitution effects then go in the same direction. The child becomes relatively richer with in-
creased h0, so the parent tends to decrease x. Furthermore, the marginal productivity of x de-
creases when h0 increases if  0 ˆ 0 ≤ x h f , which also tends to decrease x.  
 
If, on the other hand, h0 and  x ˆ  amplify each other, so that  0 ˆ 0 > x h f  we cannot tell whether the 
parent increases or decreases time spent educating the child, as income and substitution ef-
fects now work in opposite directions, since marginal productivity of x now increases with h0.  
 
The total effect on the child’s human capital, hk is achieved by implicitly differentiating (2) 
with respect to h0: 


















,                 (13) 
which implies 
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.            (14) 
If   0 ˆ 0 ≥ x h f  the total effect is positive, so even if the parent might decrease his own invest-
ment, he will not decrease it in a one-for-one proportion. If, on the other hand,  0 ˆ 0 < x h f , we 
cannot tell whether hk increases or decreases.  
Because the effect on hk is ambiguous, so is the effect on the child’s consumption, ck, because 













.                                (B3)   31
Parental human capital hp 
When hp increases, there is no clear effect on x. The parent becomes richer, and therefore 
tends to increase the transfer to the child. However, he also becomes more productive in the 
labour market, which tends to have the opposite effect. Thus, we have 
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   (B4) 
We cannot tell whether this derivative is positive or negative. The total effect on within-the-
family education is, however, positive, irrespective of the effect on time investment, because 
time itself becomes more productive. 


































,                (15) 
and thus also ck increases: 
















.                 (B5) 
 
 
Parental wage rate wp 
When the parental net wage rate increases, the income effect is positive, but it also becomes 
relatively more profitable to work in the market than to spend time on within-the-family edu-
cation, so we cannot tell what will actually happen to educational time investment: 
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.               (B6) 
The effects on hk and ck will go in the same direction as the effect on x: 
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we can rewrite (B6) as 
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.                 (B9) 
We then conclude that the following holds: 
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The child’s wage rate wk 
If the child’s net wage rate increases, the child becomes richer, so the income effect tends to 
decrease within-the-family education. On the other hand, educational investments become 
more favourable when the returns increase, so we have two counteracting effects: 
                  () ()
C
k s x p k k k
k A
u u f h U h w
w
x 1 ) 1 (
2
22 11 ˆ − − + ′ ′
=
∂
∂ σ τ γ
,             (B10) 
where  k k k k k h w U U ′ ′ ′ − = / σ  is the elasticity of substitution of the child’s utility function, which 
determines the qualitative effect of wk on x. It follows that 







σ    33
















In the same way, total human capital, hk also depends on  k σ , because 















ˆ .                                   (B11) 
However, because wk itself increases, the child’s income, and thereby consumption will in-
crease, irrespective of the effect on within-the-family education: 
() ( )
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                       (B12) 
 
The wealth tax τs 
If taxation on savings increases, the parent becomes poorer, which tends to decrease within-
the-family education. However, it becomes relatively more profitable to invest in within-the-
family education. Theses two effects go in opposite directions, and we cannot clearly say 
which effect dominates the other; i.e. we have that  
  
C
p s p p
s A





 .               (B13) 
Hence, the size of σp determines in what direction within-the-family education changes in 
case of an increased wealth tax:  
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix C – The interior solution ( the rich ) 
The equation system representing the solution for a rich parent, i.e. a parent in the interior 
solution with a positive bequest is presented in equation (C1) on the previous page. The sys-
tem determinant of the left-hand side matrix in (C1) is 
0 ˆ ˆ




22 11 > − + ′ ′ − + = Ω s k b u u U u u τ τ γ . 
For a rich parent in the interior solution comparative statics are carried out using Cramer’s 
rule, in the same way as in the corner solution. Except for x, and, b, I also study the effect on 
the child’s total human capital, hk, and consumption, ck. Contrary to the corner solution, valid 
for poor parents, there is now only a substitution effect connected with the parent’s educa-
tional investment. The income effect only affects the physical bequest.   
 
Public education h0 
If the level of publicly provided education, h0 increases, also the relative return to x is af-
fected, which alters within-the-family education: 













.                   (16) 
If  0 ˆ 0 > x h f , increased h0 increases the marginal productivity of x, which induces the parent to 
spend more time educating the child. If  0 ˆ 0 < x h f  the parent will instead decrease x. The total 
effect on hk, also including the direct effect caused by h0 is 
x x
























.                (C2)  
If  0 ˆ 0 ≥ x h f  we get an unambiguous effect on human capital; increased h0 implies increased x, 
and of course, increased over-all human capital. If, on the other hand,  0 ˆ 0 < x h f  the total effect 
on hk is unclear, because public and private investments go in opposite directions. Also the 
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.                (17) 
The income- and substitution effects go in opposite directions when  0 ˆ 0 < x h f , but if  0 ˆ 0 ≥ x h f  it 
is more favourable to invest in human capital (the substitution effect) at the same time as the 
child becomes richer with increased h0 (the income effect). Both these effects tend to decrease 
the bequest, so in this case we get an unambiguous effect on b. 
 
However, irrespective of the mix of within-the-family education and bequests, the rich child 
is always left with a higher consumption after an increase in h0: 
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k τ .                  (18) 
 
Parental human capital hp 
If parental human capital, hp increases, the parent’s productivity will rise, in paid work, as 
well as in the efforts to educate the child. Because it is the effective time that counts, the par-
ent will reduce time spent on within-the-family education, and instead work more: 







.                 (C3) 
The effective time in within-the-family education, however, remains unchanged: 
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ˆ











































.               (C4) 
This specific solution, however, hinges on the assumption that it is the effective time, 
p xh x = ˆ , which is the input in within-the-family education. If x and hp would have been sepa-
rate variables there would be no unambiguous effect on x from an increase in hp. The wage 







choose to spend more time at work, or more time educating the child.  
 
With a higher hp the parent works more, and gets richer, while the child receives the same 
level of human capital as before. Due to the positive income effect, the parent then increases 
the bequest: 
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,                            (C5) 
and, naturally also consumption increases, 














τ .                 (C6) 
Parental wage rate wp 
The only effect on within-the-family education from an increased parental net wage rate is the 
negative substitution effect, due to the higher profitability of market work. The positive in-
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.               (C8) 
The total effect on the child’s consumption is, however, positive due to the income effect: 
0




























τ .               (C9) 
 
The child’s wage rate wk 
Within-the-family education becomes more favourable after an increase in the child’s net-







For the poor parent, the opposite directions of income and substitution effects implied an un-
determined effect on within-the-family education. For a rich parent, who also leaves a physi-
cal bequest, the reduction will be made entirely on that bequest, and within-the-family educa-
tion will actually increase, due to the substitution effect: 
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.             (C11) 
The child’s consumption, ck is influenced by the shifts in bequests and education, but also by 
the wage rate, itself: 
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k τ .                      (C12) 
 
The wealth tax τs 
If the wealth tax increases, it becomes less profitable to save and leave a bequest. Hence x 
increases due to the substitution effect: 
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.                          (C13) 
The parent instead decreases b, both due to the income and substitution effects:
17 
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.             (C15) 
                                                 
17 I assume that the parent will remain in the interior solution, also after the marginal increase in τs. However, if 
τs becomes large enough, the parent will not find it worthwhile to save and leave a bequest anymore, but we 







Tax on bequests τb 
If the tax that the child has to pay on the bequest, increases, the parent will substitute away 
from bequeathing, and instead spend more on within-the-family education: 













.               (C16) 
The effect on the bequest is less straightforward. On the one hand, the parent wants to reduce 
b due to the substitution effect, but on the other hand he wants to compensate the child for the 
decreased income, created by heavier taxation. However, there is a tax wedge connected with 
this compensation, which makes it impossible to completely compensate the loss. We have 
that: 
       () ()
x x
s p k b k s
b f
w U b U u u b
ˆ ˆ
2 2 2









.              (C17) 
The sign is undetermined. The curvature of the child’s utility function becomes crucial for the 
outcome of b, but ck unambiguously decreases: 
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Appendix D – Proof of Proposition 2 
Assume that the utility function is logarithmic, and that the production function for human 
capital is of Cobb-Douglas type. Then the parent maximises 
                
{} ( ) () ( ) ) 1 ( ln ) 1 ( ln ) 1 ( ln max
, , b k k s p p p s b x b h w b s s x h w U τ γ τ − + + − − + − − = ,              (D1) 
where 







In this case the poor parent invests the following amount in the child’s human capital: 






poor x ,                  (D2) 
which, together with public investments, h0 result in the following level of human capital: 





















h h .                 (D3) 






























x ,                 (D4) 
which makes  the total level of human capital: 

























h h .                 (D5) 
The ratio between the human capital of poor and rich children is 















































,               (D6) 
and it changes with public education: 
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,               (D7) 
 
implying that the educational gap between rich and poor increases when more resources are 







est; also the relative change in consumption possibilities has to be considered. It is easy to 
show that in the Cobb-Douglas case, we have that: 
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where 
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k h  are defined above.  
 
Hence, it follows that: 
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.               (D9) 
Hence, increased public education does not increase equality in terms of human capital, but it 




Appendix E – A PAYGO system 
If a lump-sum transfer, P, is paid by the adult child, and given to the elderly parent, the parent 
maximises 
           
{} ( ) () ( ) P b h w U P b s u s x h w u U b k k k s p p p
s b x − − + + + − − + − − = ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( max
, , τ γ τ .       (21) 
 
Rich parent 
For the rich parent, who leaves a bequest,  0 > b the comparative statics with respect to P are 
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τ .          (E4) 
The rich parent’s consumption in both periods is affected in the following way: 
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1 ) 1 ( .               (E6) 
From (E2) - (E6) it is clear that in absence of the bequest tax,  b τ , Ricardian Equivalence 
holds, and the lump-sum transfer would make no difference to the rich family. However, if 
0 > b τ , there will be a tax wedge, such that 
















b τ . 
Hence, the rich family is worse off, the higher is the transfer P, if the bequest tax  0 > b τ . 
 
Poor parent 
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where  0 > C A  is defined in Appendix B. 
 
If P continues to increase, x will eventually reach the point where  x k s b p f w w ˆ ) 1 )( 1 ( = − − τ τ , 
and also the former corner-solution parent will end up in the interior solution. Hence, with a 
sufficiently high P, everyone in the economy will be in the interior solution with the same 
amount of human capital, and the corner-solution inefficiency will be gone. If there is no be-
quest tax, such a policy would be Pareto improving. 
 